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Abstract
This paper analyses the highly contested concept of American exceptionalism, as described in the 
speeches of Barak Obama. The authors of the paper use discourse analysis to show that Obama 
is using the idea of American exceptionalism on two levels: US foreign policy and the US stance 
towards international law. Our conclusion is that Obama uses an implicit dual discourse in both these 
fields. Obama favours active US foreign policy, based on soft power instruments and multilateralism. 
He insists that American exceptionalism does not mean that the US can exempt itself from the norms 
of international law, however, he does not think the US should always have a very active foreign 
policy. He makes room for unilateral acting and the use of hard power instruments in foreign policy. 
He allows for the use of force even if is not in accordance with the norms of international law, when 
US national interests are threatened.
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Introduction 
On the 10th of September 2013, Barak Obama gave a speech regarding 
the situation in Syria. At the end of the speech he said that “America 
is not the world’s policeman… But when… we can stop children from 
being gassed to death… I believe we should act. That’s what makes us 
exceptional” (Obama 2013a). The following day, the New York Times 
published Vladimir Putin’s text in which he made a comment about 
American exceptionalism: “[M]y working and personal relationship with 
President Obama is marked by growing trust. I appreciate this. I carefully 
studied his address to the nation on Tuesday. And I would rather disagree 
with a case he made on American Exceptionalism… It is extremely 
dangerous to encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, 
whatever the motivation” (Putin 2013). He also said that “the law is still the 
law, and we must follow it whether we like it or not” (Ibid.). 
Putin’s criticism gained a great deal of attention in the US media, and 
although Obama did not stop using the term ‘American exceptionalism’ 
he was criticised for not believing in it enough (File 2015). The crisis in Ukraine 
opened the debate over Vladimir Putin’s hypocrisy and the genealogy of 
the Russian exceptionalism. Arguments between Moscow and Washington 
about the potential influence of the idea of American exceptionalism on 
American foreign policy and its stance towards international law are still 
being exchanged today (Security Council of Russian Federation on US 
National Security Strategy 2015). 
These examples illustrate the importance of the use of the idea of 
American exceptionalism. American exceptionalism represents one of 
the most important aspects of American identity. The best indicator for this 
claim is the fact that exceptionalism is widely accepted in public opinion 
as something that characterises the USA (Jones 2010).1 There is no single 
fixed meaning of American exceptionalism, however, and the description 
of this concept is variable. On the one hand, different perceptions of the 
American role in the world, coming from the different variants of American 
exceptionalism, might lead to completely different practices. On the 
1 Although the Pew Research Center poll from 2014 shows that belief in American exceptionalism: “has declined 10 
points since 2011” it is still very high (Source: Tyson, A., 2014. Most Americans think the USA is great but few say it’s the 
greatest. Pew Research Center. Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/02/most-americans-
think-the-u-s-is-great-but-fewer-say-its-the-greatest/ [accessed May 29 2015].
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other hand, different practices in American foreign policy might lead to 
a change in the discursive articulation of the concept in the purpose of 
adjustment of the identity with the current practice and consequential 
legitimisation of the practice. 
In this paper we analyse the way Barak Obama uses the idea of American 
exceptionalism on two levels: US foreign policy and the US stance towards 
international law. Our main conclusion is that Obama uses implicit dual 
discourse in both these fields. In US foreign policy Obama predominantly 
uses the term ‘American exceptionalism’ as consists of an active foreign 
policy, favours a multilateral to a unilateral approach, and insists on the 
importance and efficiency of the soft power instruments of foreign policy 
instead of hard power. There is dualism present in Obama’s discourse 
however, because his perception of activism in foreign policy is not without 
boundaries, unilateralism is not inconsistent with exceptionalism, and 
“smart” use and the development of hard power are also acknowledged 
as important. 
Similarly, in the context of the US stance towards international law, Obama 
regularly states that America should not be exempt from international 
legal order, and that what makes the US exceptional is not an ability to 
flout international norms and the rule of law, but the willingness to confirm 
them through US actions. Obama’s discourse in the field of the prohibition 
of the threat or use of force in international relations, however, reveals 
that he is trying to “maintain the right” of the US to use force whenever it 
is in accordance with their own national interest.
This research paper consists of six chapters. After the introduction, we 
explain in Chapter II the analytical framework of our research. In Chapter 
III we briefly explain the genealogy of ‘American exceptionalism’. In 
Chapter IV we analyse Obama’s discourse on American exceptionalism 
towards US foreign policy. In the fifth chapter we apply the same analysis 
to Obama’s discourse on American exceptionalism in international law. 
Finally, in Chapter VI we make concluding remarks. 
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Analytical Framework
Theorists of international relations (IR) have recently paid more attention 
to the concept of American exceptionalism, as an important part of US 
identity. American exceptionalism is probably one of the most important 
elements of US identity. As Restad (2012: 53) notes, many see American 
identity and American exceptionalism as equivalent. Most US foreign 
policy writers treat identity and ‘domestic ideas about what kind of country 
the United States is’, as important in the explanation of its foreign policy 
(ibid). The role of identity in foreign policy is acknowledged in some of 
the most important theoretical approaches, such as neoclassical realism, 
liberalism, social constructivism, as well as by critical IR approaches. 
Social constructivism places special emphasis on identity. For constructivists, 
identity is a key issue in the construction of reality, since “the more we act 
toward an entity as if it has a particular representation or meaning, the 
more that entity can take on that representation” (Najak and Malone 
2015: 256). The poststructuralist approach also places special emphasis on 
identity. It considers identity and (foreign) policy as mutually constitutive 
and discursively linked (Hansen 2006: 25). Adjustments to both practice 
(policy) and identity are possible through discourse. The goal of foreign 
policy actors “is to present foreign policy that appears legitimate and 
enforceable to its relevant audience” (Hansen 2006: 26).
For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to conclude that the concept of 
American exceptionalism is generally considered relevant in the analysis 
of American foreign policy, and especially in the US attitude towards 
international law. In this paper, we accept this widespread attitude. We 
additionally underline the thesis of Hughes (2015: 528), explaining that 
the relevance of this concept for IR scholars is “that it provides a cultural 
mechanism for legitimating foreign policy decisions and practices”. Since 
there is no single and fixed meaning of this concept, we find it theoretically 
and practically relevant to explain how Barak Obama, as a key US foreign 
policy decision-maker, understands and uses this concept. It is a first and 
necessary step for any further theorisation of the influence of this aspect 
of US identity in its foreign policy. 
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In order to conduct our research, we focus on the way President Obama 
uses the concept of American exceptionalism in his speeches related to 
foreign policy and international law issues. We therefore use a method 
of discourse analysis. The objects of our analysis are Obama’s public 
speeches. We do not specifically analyse Obama’s foreign policy practice 
outside the discourse. 
Despite the fact that there is no single and fixed meaning of American 
exceptionalism, there were some patterns (or “genres”) of its use in history. 
Prescriptions of different patterns for US foreign policy and stance towards 
international law are especially important for our analysis. In order to 
clarify Obama’s understanding of the concept in foreign policy and 
international law issues, we will, therefore, adopt a two-level research 
framework:
1. Secondary source literature review –which will make it possible for us 
to locate different “genres” in the meaning of American exception-
alism in the context of foreign policy and international law; 
2. Analysis of the primary sources (Obama’s speeches) – which will en-
able us to classify Obama’s American exceptionalism discourse in 
these genres of meaning.
The notion of American exceptionalism 
American exceptionalism is an essentially contested concept. Various US 
statesmen, politicians and intellectuals have associated it with different 
meanings, and therefore, certain social scientists made efforts to define 
the most proper and precise meaning of this concept. One group of social 
scientists conducted an in-depth historical, sociological and political 
analysis in order to question the old Tocqueville (2004) thesis that America 
is qualitatively different (or an exception, as it was later framed) to the 
rest of the world. The American political scientist Lipset (1997) is a typical 
representative of this group. 
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In the field of International Relations, however, the majority of scholars have 
focused on clarifying and analysing the influence of the phenomenon 
of American exceptionalism on US foreign policy (Deudny and Meiser 
2012; Hodgson 2009; Bachevic 2008; McCrisken 2003; McEvoy-Levy 2001). 
This means that these scholars were not questioning whether America 
is exceptional according to particular criteria, but whether Americans 
believe that America is exceptional, and how this important belief 
(ideational variable) influences US foreign policy. 
A typical representative of realist theory, Steven Walt (2011), understood 
this concept as something similar to American primacy in power and 
the tendency to perceive others in the international arena as unequal. 
Liberal approaches associated American exceptionalism with the unique 
character of American democracy and with that what Tony Smith (1994) 
calls ‘the American Mission’ - the possibility of spreading democracy 
around the globe, and “make of world a better place”.
The poststructuralist approach adopted by Pease (2009: 9) considered 
American exceptionalism as a national “fantasy”, composed of 
“incompatible elements”, which actually made it possible to survive and 
adapt to different circumstances. He considered the evolution of this 
concept as a way of “othering” primarily of the Soviet Union, but also 
of Europe and the so-called ‘third world’ (Pease 2009: 10-11). Najak 
and Malone (2012), put additional emphasis on the role of American 
exceptionalism discourse as an addition to American Orientalism 
discourse, and treated it as a way US distinguishes itself from “others” in 
the Western world, especially Europe.
Most relevant for our analysis are authors who undertook comprehensive 
research into the way in which the concept was used and the meaning 
it had in public debates about foreign policy. One of the most important 
contributions regarding the patterns of use of this concept in foreign 
policy is work of McCrisken (2003). He claims that there were two different 
strands of American exceptionalism which had two different foreign policy 
prescriptions: 1) exemplary – prescribing isolationism; and 2) missionary- 
prescribing an active international role. Deudny and Meiser (2012) confirm 
that American exceptionalism has been taken as fundamental to both 
activism and isolationism at different periods. 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (73) - 2015
31
More recently, Leah Achor (2012) conducted a detailed analysis 
of the patterns in which “American exceptionalism” was used 
over the last few centuries and concluded that there were seven 
different patterns (genres). Based on the criteria of prescriptions for 
foreign policy present in American exceptionalism discourse, Achor 
(2012) defines three different groups: 1) isolationism, protectionism, 
unilateralism; 2) active foreign policy; and 3) strong multilateralism. 
Several works have criticised Achor’s thesis, based on the distinction 
between isolationism and internationalism. Hughes (2015: 541) argues 
that the work of the majority of IR scholars who accept the distinction 
between isolationism and internationalism is based on the findings of 
“lazy historiography”. He points out the findings of revisionist historians, 
such as William Appleman Williams, which have challenged the 
thesis that the US was ever really isolationist (ibid). Previously, Restad 
(2012) also criticised research based on the dichotomy explored by 
McCriksen, and the many other political scientists that have followed 
his ideas, suggesting that the thesis of American isolationism is 
outdated.
We respect the findings of these critics, however, we consider that 
a negation of the existence of pure isolationism in US foreign policy 
history does not mean that different conceptions of American 
exceptionalism do not contain different prescriptions regarding the 
scope and level of activity of US foreign policy. In addition, the period 
in which America was focused only on the western hemisphere, even 
if we do not call it “isolationism”, was definitely more passive towards 
the world as a whole than the period that came after. As Mearsheimer 
(2011: 18) points out, there are still libertarians today advocating US 
foreign policy similar to isolationism. These libertarians actually believe 
that the US is different and better than other countries in the world. 
We thus expand our model in comparison with McCriksen’s 
conventional dichotomous model and adjust the content of his main 
dichotomy to the findings of the critics. The model that will be used 
in this work to analyse foreign policy oriented aspects of American 
exceptionalism discourse is based on three different dichotomies. 
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The first is the dichotomy between: a) active foreign policy, and b) 
passive foreign policy. For the reasons explained above, we find this a 
more appropriate dichotomy than isolationism/internationalism. The 
second dichotomy is the dichotomy between: a) unilateralism, and b) 
multilateralism. This distinction helps us to clarify whether the prescriptions 
derived from discourse are tied to the unilateral US role in the international 
politics, or to a multilateral approach which seeks to find more partners 
for the US. Finally, as Stretch and Mara (2014: 5) argue in their article, the 
roots of American exceptionalism could be traced back both to hawkish 
(Jackson’s expansionism) and dovish policies (Wilson’s idealism). The main 
difference between hawks and doves today lies in different perceptions of 
the usefulness of foreign policy instruments. Our third dichotomy therefore 
takes into account two basic means of power (Nye 2004: 25) as a basis 
for different foreign policy instruments: a) hard power, and b) soft power.
We believe that these three dichotomies present, historically, the most 
important variations in the discursive framing of this concept. In the 
following chapter, we will try to locate Obama’s use of this discourse in 
one of the three categories (genres) on both scales.
American exceptionalism is not an essentially contested concept only 
in the field of foreign policy. Its connection or even tension with the 
norms of international law is well established (Ignatieff 2009; Koh 2003; 
Posner and Bredford 2011, etc.). Unfortunately, the dichotomies that we 
suggested in the analysis of the relationship between the concept of 
American exceptionalism and foreign policy were not very useful in this 
sense. Neither active nor passive foreign policy explains the relationship 
between the concept of American exceptionalism and international 
law. The same is true for unilateralism and multilateralism: unilateral self-
defence, for example, could be in accordance with international law, 
but multilateral actions, such as that in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1999 or Iraq in 2003, were violations of international law norms. This is 
why we need to make a different analysis of the relationship between the 
concept of American exceptionalism and international law. 
The doctrine of international law reveals different interpretations of the 
influence of the use of the concept of American exceptionalism in 
international law norms. Koh (2003: 1482), for example, states that “the 
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term “American exceptionalism” has been used far too loosely and without 
meaningful nuance”. This is why he suggests four possible meanings of 
American exceptionalism: distinctive rights, different labels, the “flying 
buttress” mentality, and double standards (Koh 2003: 1483). At the same time 
he finds that the most dangerous meaning of American exceptionalism is 
the last one – double standards. By double standards Koh means a situation 
in which “the United States proposes that a different rule should apply to 
itself than applies to the rest of the world” (Koh 2003: 1486). 
Another relevant example is Ignatieff’s three different interpretations 
of the concept of American exceptionalism: the first is connected with 
the USA reservations, non-ratification or non-compliance of human 
rights and humanitarian law conventions (Ignatieff 2009: 3). The second 
is encompassed by the term ‘double standards’ – “judging itself and its 
friends by more permissive criteria than it does its enemies” (ibid). The third 
is connected with USA denial of the jurisdiction of human rights law within 
its own domestic law. 
Bredford and Posner strongly criticise the aforementioned and similar 
classifications of the concept of American exceptionalism. They offer a 
different explanation for United States foreign policy and its stance towards 
international law by claiming that there is nothing exceptional in American 
exceptionalism and that every powerful country is exceptional in its own 
way. It is obvious that the term exceptional is differently understood in 
the work of Bredford and Posner. They claim that all powerful nations 
“advance interpretations of international law that reflect their values and 
advance their interests” (Ignatieff 2009: 5). Bredford and Posner see a 
strong difference between this version of exceptionalism and the concept 
of exemptionalism which suggests “that the rules of international law… 
apply to all states except for one particular state” (Ignatieff 2009: 7). To 
conclude, they believe that there is an American exceptionalism which is 
not so very different from that of the Chinese one or that of the European 
Union, but that there is no such thing as American Exemptionalism. 
For the purpose of this analysis, we are not going to use this distinction 
between the terms exceptionalism and exemptionalism. The main reason 
for this is that we are going to analyse Obama’s discourse about the 
American stance towards international law. Obama does not use the 
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term exemptionalism, although he sometimes criticises a practice that 
could be very similar to this concept. We are thus going to treat the term 
exemptionalism as part of the term exceptionalism. 
Ultimately, we would like to emphasise that the sovereign equality of states 
as a general principle of international law does not mean an absolute 
legal equality of all states in international community (Simpson 2004). In 
other words, in some specific areas of international law, some states could 
be an exception, such as when great powers, including the United States, 
have a special legal status in certain situations (the most obvious example 
is the status of permanent membership in Security Council). It is, however, 
important to bear in mind that this special legal status is accepted by 
other subjects in the international community. Otherwise, we are dealing 
with the unilateral promotion of so-called exceptionalism, which is used 
only to legitimize violations of the international law norms.
Obama’s discourse on American exceptionalism and 
US foreign policy 
Foreign policy connotations and prescriptions are an integral part of the 
American exceptionalism discourse. President Obama often used this 
concept in his speeches, even more so than George W. Bush (Gilmore 2013: 
77-78). Despite this, President Obama was widely criticised for his “lack 
of belief” in American exceptionalism by conservative politicians such as 
Mitt Romney (Rucker 2012) and Rudi Giuliani (File 2015). This concept is 
very important for Barack Obama, and it was the topic of his first political 
speech at national level (Obama 2012a). Its content for Obama was not 
the same as that understood by Bush, Romney or Giuliani. The claims of his 
critics are actually based on this different understanding and definition of 
the concept, in comparison with those of Obama’s predecessor and the 
current conservative political elite. 
Barack Obama belongs to the group of believers and proponents of 
American exceptionalism that prescribes active foreign policy, favours 
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multilateral to unilateral approach and insists on the importance and 
efficiency the soft power instruments of foreign policy as something 
that makes America exceptional. Obama’s perception of activism in 
foreign policy is not without any boundaries, however: unilateralism is not 
inconsistent with exceptionalism, while “smart” use and the development 
of hard power are also acknowledged as important. Therefore, while 
emphasising one particular combination of these factors (active-
multilateral-soft), Obama more or less directly legitimises their contrasts 
as well, as something that is at least not contradictory to American 
exceptionalism, if not an integral part of it. We claim that Obama uses 
an implicit dual discourse regarding American exceptionalism, which is 
unbalanced in favour of the combination of factors. In this chapter we will 
further develop and try to explain our thesis about Obama’s unbalanced 
dual discourse, analysing in detail Obama’s American exceptionalism 
discourse position in the three dichotomies described above.
a. Active vs. passive foreign policy
President Obama is a strong and decisive proponent of active American 
foreign policy, and considers US activity and decisiveness to confront 
the threats on international level to be the essence of American 
exceptionalism (Obama 2015a). This was often associated in Obama’s 
speeches with historical examples of what Obama considered the 
brightest side of American activism and international leadership. In his 
famous interview during the G20 summit in 2009, he underlined the role 
of the USA in European liberation, reconstruction and unification, pointing 
out the expenditure of American resources, sacrifices of the troops and 
leadership of the new alliances after the Second World War as something 
exceptional in history (Obama 2009a). 
In another speech, Obama analysed various historical challenges for 
American leadership in the twentieth century history of the USA (the Great 
Depression, Perl Harbour, Vietnam, the economic rise of Japan and the 
Asian tigers) concluding that the US always managed to overcome these 
potential problems and to remain a leader (Obama 2012b). As Obama 
points out, the USA is therefore an “indispensable nation in world affairs” 
and “one of the many examples of why America is exceptional” (ibid). 
This attitude implicitly contains a message that a passive policy which 
would lead toward an abandoning of American leadership would not be 
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considered as part of genuine American exceptionalism in the historical 
continuum. 
Regarding contemporary issues, Obama stated that US engagement and 
decisiveness to “stop children being gassed to death”, such as in Syria, is 
something that makes the US exceptional (Obama 2013a). Obama even 
explicitly emphasised the risk to the whole world of American passivity 
and isolationism in the case of disengagement from regions such as the 
Middle East:
“Now, I believe such disengagement would be a mistake. I 
believe America must remain engaged for our own security. But 
I also believe the world is better for it. Some may disagree, but I 
believe America is exceptional, in part because we have shown 
a willingness through the sacrifice of blood and treasure to stand 
up not only for our own narrow self-interests, but for the interests 
of all” (Obama 2013b).
It is important to note that Obama’s perception of activism and leadership 
is not entirely without boundaries. He warned against “reacting to the 
headlines instead of using our heads” (Obama 2015b) and explicitly 
stated that “America is not a world policeman” (Obama 2013a). In 
practice, however, it is often hard to distinguish positive active foreign 
policy from negative “world policeman” foreign policy. Boundaries 
between these two concepts are usually found in international law, as 
well as the legitimate interests of other states. It is thus very important to 
analyse the way Obama perceives these concepts in the context of 
American exceptionalism. As it can be argued, Obama’s perception 
of the importance of International Law and multilateralism for American 
exceptionalism is somewhat ambiguous and without clear shape. 
Consequently, it is hard to define where precisely the border should be for 
American activism, if the US wants to stay positively exceptional, instead 
of becoming a negative interference in international affairs. 
b. Unilateralism vs. multilateralism
American exceptionalism has often been associated in Obama’s 
speeches with multilateralism in foreign policy. This association shows us 
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that Obama’s perception of active foreign policy does not include the 
aforementioned “world policeman” model, based on unilateralism. His 
attitude is that American exceptionalism and global leadership must, in 
the most important global processes, involve other relevant international 
actors as well. This approach was called “leading from behind” (Halper 
2012). Obama noted US coalition-building skills as one of the things that 
makes the US exceptional:
“Looking to the future instead of the past, making sure we match 
our power with diplomacy and use force wisely, building coalitions 
to meet new challenges and opportunities, leading always with 
the example of our values—that’s what makes us exceptional. 
That’s what keeps us strong. That’s why we have to keep striving 
to hold ourselves to the highest of standards: our own” (Obama 
2015b).
In the interview noted above on American exceptionalism during a G20 
summit, Obama stated that America’s “extraordinary role in leading 
the world” is not in contradiction to creating partnerships, since the US 
“can’t solve these problems alone” (Obama 2009a). Obama thinks that 
US values orienting the country’s strategic thinking towards multilateralism. 
He pointed out that the American tendency to “think what’s good for the 
world”, and not only to think about its own interest, is one of the things that 
make America exceptional (Obama 2011a).
This does not mean that unilateralism is completely erased form Obama’s 
American exceptionalism discourse. On the one hand, in his statement on 
the 2015 National Security Strategy which glorifies the “exceptional role” 
of the US, President Obama stated that there is a possibility of unilateral 
reaction when “core interests” are endangered, although he added that 
even then it is better to tackle issues multilaterally (Obama 2015c). In his 
2014 West Point address, Obama announced the possibility of the unilateral 
use of military force, if “core interests demand it” (Obama 2014a). On the 
other hand, in the same address (which contains many explicit references 
to American exceptionalism), President Obama stated that an important 
element of American leadership was international institutions since “they 
reduce the need for unilateral American action” (ibid).
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It is obvious that multilateralism is something Obama considers essential for 
American leadership and exceptionalism, but unilateralism is perceived 
as something that is not necessarily in contradiction with these concepts, 
if it is used only when “core interests” are in question. This concept of 
“core interests” is somewhat ambiguous, however, and open to different 
interpretations. It is therefore necessary to conclude that, while favouring 
and emphasising multilateralism as an essential part of American 
exceptionalism, Obama also legitimises the possibility of unilateral action 
which would not hinder this exceptionalism.
c. hard power vs. soft power
 “The question is not whether America leads in the world, but how”, said 
President Obama in January 2015 (Obama 2015b). The issue of the nature 
and form of American power is obviously very important to the president. 
If we had to describe Obama’s approach to the most desirable form of 
power in two words, the most precise concept would be smart power. 
This term was coined by Joseph Nye (2009) to describe the successful 
combination of hard and soft power instruments. In his speeches President 
Obama underlined explicitly and implicitly the need to rely on instruments 
of both hard and soft power. He claimed that the skill of matching “power 
with diplomacy” and the wise use of force is something that makes the US 
exceptional (Obama 2015b).
Obama put much more emphasis in his speeches on the effectiveness 
of soft power than on hard power instruments as the core content of 
American exceptionalism. Earlier diplomatic successes, such as McCain’s 
effort to restore diplomatic ties with Vietnam, were characterised as 
exceptional (Obama 2012c), and the restoration of diplomatic ties with 
Cuba and success of the diplomatic negotiations with Iran were also 
glorified (Obama 2015b). Obama also claimed that American leadership 
in science and research (Obama 2014b), as well as the attractiveness 
of American universities (Obama 2014c) is something that makes the US 
exceptional. He even underlined the importance of the entertainment 
industry in American superpower status and exceptionalism (Obama 
2013c). American ideals and its internal inclusiveness are, according 
to Obama’s speeches, the essence of the American power to attract 
people from around the world and of its exceptionalism (Obama 2014d, 
2014e, 2012d). In one of his speeches, Obama emphasised:
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“…I travel around the world a lot, and I’m not somebody who 
expects that other people love their country any less than we 
love ours, but I will tell you there is something exceptional and 
special about this country. And there are very few people around 
the world who wouldn’t do everything they could to be citizens of 
the United States or have the same opportunities that we have” 
(Obama 2012e).
In his speeches involving American exceptionalism, Obama also stated his 
opinion of the lack of hard power in tackling some of the most problematic 
global issues. The President said that military power is not enough to solve 
issues such as world terrorism, but that other means are necessary to fight 
its causes (Obama 2015c). Ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was 
also treated as something good for America (Obama 2012b). Already 
noted examples of Obama’s rhetorical tendency to avoid war solutions 
can be summarized in his following words – “the American people expect 
us only to go to war as a last resort” (Obama 2015b).
Obama definitely favours soft to hard power and emphasises it as more 
important for the content of American exceptionalism. It does not, 
however, mean that President Obama leaves no room for hard power. 
On the contrary, although it does not seem so at first sight, he actually 
leaves a great deal of room for the use of such power as an instrument 
of foreign policy and also connects it with American exceptionalism. 
The “sacrifice of blood and treasure” for global interest is believed 
by Obama to be part of those things that make America exceptional 
(Obama 2013b). He also classified the patriotism of US military servants 
in this category of exceptionality (Obama 2014f). It is important to note 
that while often placing emphasis on ideas and creed as the essence 
of American exceptionalism, Obama does not negate the importance 
of the military and economy as aspects of hard power for American 
exceptionalism, but usually suggests that they are not enough (Obama 
2013b). This does not mean that they are not also important. Obama’s 
message is that they are not enough for exceptionalism on their own, but 
that they are important, and probably necessary for it. 
It is also important to note that Obama avoided using the term “war” in the 
context of American exceptionalism, but he did not resort to connecting 
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various other instruments based on hard power with this concept. First of 
all, he congratulated economic coercive instruments, such as economic 
sanctions, for the pain they impose on the Russian economy (Obama 
2015c). Secondly, Obama openly applauded the use of hard (military) 
power in a non-coercive way for fighting global problems, such as Ebola, 
and marked these achievements of American military as exceptional 
(Obama 2015a). Finally, as we have already noted, he left space for the 
direct use of coercive military measures when “core interests and values” 
are threatened, in a “smart” manner. 
It is obvious that, despite the constant highlighting of soft power 
instruments and insisting on the “smart” and bounded use of hard power, 
Obama’s exceptionalism discourse leaves a great deal of space for the 
legitimate unbounded use of force. Phrases such as “core interests”, 
“national interests”, “global interests” or “national security” are essentially 
contested and there is no consensus regarding the precise content of 
these categories, which should if necessary be protected even by force. 
The meaning of these concepts is shaped by various public actors in the 
security sector, and the US President is probably the figure with the greatest 
degree of social capital possession. The President therefore leaves enough 
space to frame a single issue as a “national security threat” (securitize) in 
the future, and consequently legitimise the use of force as a necessary 
special measure for dealing with that threat.2
Obama’s speeches on American exceptionalism and 
international law
In his very first interview after inauguration in 2009, Barak Obama noted “… 
that the language we use matters” (Obama 2009b). Although the notion 
of international law is not so frequently noted in his speeches, there are 
some important exceptions. We believe this is why it is more illustrative to 
focus specifically on one of these exceptions in order to show how Obama 
understands notions of international law, and American exceptionalism, 
2 More details about securitization theory in security studies: Buzan, B., Waver, O., De Wilde, J., 1998. Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Ryner.
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and their relationship. We are going to focus on the speech Obama gave 
at West Point on the 28th of May 2014. 
In this part of our paper we claim that Obama uses implicit dual discourse 
about the relationship between the concept of American exceptionalism 
and international law. Although on a general level Obama declares that 
the US should not be exempt from international law norms, he “reserves 
the right” of the US to use force in international relations in a way which 
could be hostile to international law norms. 
It is interesting to note that in his West Point speech Obama mentioned 
international law or norms of international law six times (as far as we 
know, more than in any other of his speeches during his two mandates). 
This is intriguing considering the place he made the speech (a military 
academy). 
We would like to underline and subsequently analyse two aspects of 
Obama’s speech at West Point:
1. The part of the speech in which we can identify his understanding of 
the right of the US to use force in international relations;
2. The part of his speech in which he talks about the general impor-
tance of international law and the US stance toward it. 
It may be fair to note at the beginning that the principle of the prohibition 
of threat and use of force in international relations is probably the greatest 
challenge of all in the context of compliance with norms of international 
law. This is particularly the case taking into account the position of the US 
as the only military super-power in the world. We believe that this is the 
reason special attention should be paid to US self-perception in this field 
of international relations and international law. 
 At the beginning of his speech Obama stated that America is an 
indispensable nation which must always lead on the word stage (Obama 
2014a). At least two interpretations of this statement are possible: 
1. America should defend this status by using all necessary means 
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(including its military power) against any state who dares to (even 
peacefully) challenge this status;
2. The status of a leader on the world stage should be preserved by 
peaceful and legal instruments.
It seems obvious that the first interpretation is contrary to the international 
legal order and that the second is complementary: states have a 
right to compete and enlarge their power, but they have to do that in 
accordance with the rules of international law. 
Obama also noted that: 
“[t]he United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, 
when our core interests demand it – when our people are 
threatened; when our livelihood is at stake; or when the security 
of our allies is in danger… America should never ask permission to 
protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life”. 
This is not the terminology of international law and Obama is not obliged 
to use it in this kind of speech. It is, however, interesting to see how it fits 
into the international legal framework. There is a consensus (Bredford and 
Posner would say it was the core of international law) in the international 
legal doctrine that the use of force is prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter3 and customary international law, although there are (at least) 
two exceptions to this prohibition: the authorisation of the use of force by 
the UN Security Council by Article 42 of the UN Charter4 and self-defence 
in accordance with Article 515 of the same legal instrument (Gray 2008; 
Dinstein 2011, Corten 2011). Nevertheless, there are fierce debates not only 
about the interpretation of these articles, but also about other possible 
3 Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations”.
4 Article 42 of the UN Charter: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and 
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations”.
5 Article 51 of the UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”.
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exceptions. The International Court of Justice adopted a restricted 
understanding of the scope of these exceptions in its jurisprudence (Military 
and Pаramilitary Activities in аnd Аgаinst Nicaragua, Merits, Judgment. 
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14), but there was serious opposition, especially in 
American legal doctrine, to this viewpoint.
It is also good to note that in the same speech Obama claimed that 
the US could use military force unilaterally, if necessary. International law 
does not prohibit the unilateral use of force in a situation of self-defence, 
however, even then, self-defence could be used only until the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) take measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security (art. 51 of the UN Charter). Additionally, self-defence must 
be proportional and necessary (Obama also noted that the use of force 
needed to be proportional, effective and just). That was also confirmed 
in jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (Oil Platforms (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2003, p. 161). Ultimately, even if the UN SC authorizes a state to use force, 
as in the case of its Resolutions 1368, 1373, 1377 and 1378, the use of force 
must be in accordance with the mandate defined by these Resolutions.6 
Be that as it may, Obama also suggested that in taking direct action 
we must uphold standards that reflect our values, but immediately 
explained what he meant by our values: taking strikes only when we face 
a continuing, imminent threat, and only where… there is near certainty 
of no civilian casualties. This raises the difficult issue of the scope of the 
self-defence rule in the context of the concept of so-called preventive 
self-defence. There is a fierce doctrinal debate about the existence of this 
concept in international law. There are authors such as Corten, who claim 
that the concept of preventive self-defence is illegal because it is not in 
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the customary law in 
this field (Corten 2010: 406). It seems that most states in the international 
community share this view (Corten 2010: 425), however, there are also 
a variety of views suggesting that preventive and/or pre-emptive self-
defence is allowed in international law (Higgins 1963; Wedgwood 2000). 
Until now, the ICJ has noted the concept of preventive self-defence 
in several cases (e.g. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
6 It is interesting to note that Obama promised in his speech at West Point that at the end of this year (2014), a new 
Afghan President will be in office and America’s combat mission will be over.
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(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2005, par. 143) but has never made a judgment that was based on it. 
Before 11th September 2001, the US took a cautious stance towards the 
concept of preventive self-defence in international law (Corten 2010). 
Even after this date, Marry O’Connell (2002: 50) noted that the US did not 
recognise the existence of a general rule of international law that would 
establish the right to pre-emptive self-defence. Accordingly, claiming the 
right of pre-emptive self-defence on the part of the United States would 
suggest exemptionalism in the US standpoint toward this international law 
rule. 
Obama probably mentioned the question of civilian casualties in the 
context of the general principles of International Humanitarian Law 
(distinction and proportionality). The American use of drones in several 
countries also raised the question of the legal concept of armed conflict 
(drones were not only used in countries in which there was an armed 
conflict in the legal sense, but also in countries such as Yemen where the 
use of drones was part of the CIA agenda) and targeted killings (Melzer 
2008).7 
As already noted, in his West Point speech Obama also talked about the 
“right” of the USA to use force without asking permission when its core 
interests were jeopardised. It is not however clear what Obama perceives 
as the core interests of the USA – what does he means when he is talking 
about situations in which people are threatened or where the American 
way of life needs protection. After all, the International Court of Justice 
found that self-defence was legal only in the case of an armed attack 
against the state (Nicaragua). By unilateral use of force to protect our 
people Obama probably means that the USA will unilaterally use force 
to protect its nationals outside US borders. The legality of this use of force 
is controversial in the doctrine of international law, although there have 
been several situations in which the USA claimed that these kinds of 
operations were legal (Arend & Beck 1993).
7 It is interesting to note that the already mentioned Harold Koh, former Legal Adviser of the Department of State (2009 – 
2013) is the subject of a controversial petition that circulated at NYU where he teaches International Human Rights Law. 
People who signed the petition (more than 200 hundred students, organisations and “concerned members of NYU 
and the global community” - https://docs.google.com/forms/d/14tNTa9_-WqCgJv3DFu_XVK2zQsfHKwIne5PEu9Ld-
2M/viewform) declared that by publicly defending the policy of the US drone programme and the policy of targeted 
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Even more controversial is to claim that the states have a right to unilaterally 
use force without permission in order to protect their own way of life. It is 
very hard to determine the specific meaning of this claim (even in the US 
there is strong disagreement regarding the interpretation of their famous 
expression life, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness) and it is probably 
even harder to defend the position that every state in the world has a 
unilateral right to use force in order to defend its own way of life. 
To conclude this part of our analysis, it is hard to believe that the US would 
agree that all nations in the world can use military force, unilaterally if 
necessary, when their core interests demand it – when their people are 
threatened; when their livelihood is at stake. It is equally hard to imagine 
that the US would permit all nations in the world to use force without 
permission in order to protect their people, their homeland, or their way 
of life. The US could not be an exception to the complete system of 
international law regarding the use of force in international relations. That 
would be an example of the negative exceptionalism noted by Koh, or 
exemptionalism in the words of Bredford and Posner. Of course, Obama’s 
statement is a political one and could be interpreted differently in order to 
fit the international legal framework (for example the interpretation that 
‘protection of the American people’ only means self-defence in the case 
of armed attack against the USA), but our intention was only to stress an 
interpretation of American exceptionalism that is almost certainly hostile 
to the order of international law. 
We have already noted that in this speech at West Point Obama also 
made some general remarks about the US stance towards international 
law. One should bear in mind that almost every political leader in the 
world would always claim that their country is obeying the norms of 
international law, however, it is important to see how Obama understands 
the relationship between American foreign policy and international law. 
Obama declares that those who claim respecting international law is a 
sign of the weakness are wrong. More importantly, he criticised the USA’s 
attitude towards important international legal instruments and offered 
a (new?) landscape of American leadership that would not be based 
on the notion of exceptionalism and that would not be hostile to the 
international legal framework: 
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“American influence is always stronger when we lead by example.  
We can’t exempt ourselves from the rules that apply to everybody 
else.  We can’t call on others to make commitments to combat 
climate change if a whole lot of our political leaders deny that it’s 
taking place.  We can’t try to resolve problems in the South China 
Sea when we have refused to make sure that the Law of the Sea 
Convention is ratified by our United States Senate, despite the 
fact that our top military leaders say the treaty advances our 
national security.  That’s not leadership; that’s retreat.  That’s not 
strength; that’s weakness.  I believe in American exceptionalism 
with every fiber of my being.  But what makes us exceptional is 
not our ability to flout international norms and the rule of law; it is 
our willingness to affirm them through our actions”.
Although Obama declared that he believed in American exceptionalism 
with every fibre of his being, his interpretation of that exceptionalism in 
this part of his speech is not hostile to the international legal framework 
(at least declaratory) because he also stated that the USA can’t exempt 
themselves from the rules that apply to everybody else, and that USA is 
exceptional in its willingness to affirm international norms through its actions. 
Obama noted two areas of international law and politics in which the USA 
was severely criticised for double standards: environmental law and the 
law of the sea (although there are other examples, such as the American 
position towards the International Criminal Court). Obama’s comment 
on double standards may be understood as his critique of the Senate’s 
practice in the field of ratification of important international agreements. 
In our opinion this was a message to the US public and senators rather 
than to people outside the US. 
It therefore seems that Obama’s discourse about American 
exceptionalism and international law rests on two basic, but probably 
opposite foundations. The first is that, at least generally speaking, the 
US can’t exempt itself from the rules of international law that apply to 
everybody else. The discourse on the rules of the prohibition on the use 
of force in international relations reveals that, at least in the most sensitive 
fields of international relations, the US wants to have almost full freedom 
to protect their own national interests. The question remains whether it 
is possible to make peace between these two foundations in order to 
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create a coherent foreign policy which would be in accordance with 
norms of international law. 
Conclusion
Due to its popularity and importance for the American public, American 
exceptionalism has been widely used in recent decades by presidents 
to justify their actions on the international stage, however, American 
exceptionalism remains an essentially contested concept. The articulation 
of its content is one of the most important aspects of the identity of the USA 
in the international arena. The findings of our analysis of secondary sources 
showed that in US public discourse there are important differences (even 
contradictions) in the articulation of this concept in terms of US foreign 
policy and its relationship with international law. The fact that a particular 
president uses or does not use the American exceptionalism concept in 
their public speeches cannot tell us about their foreign policy or stance 
towards international law. It is necessary to analyse the way a particular 
president uses this concept and the meanings they associate with it.
Based on the analysis of primary sources (public speeches) we have 
concluded that Barack Obama has unbalanced the dual American 
exceptionalism discourse concerning foreign policy and relations with 
international law. Obama favours active US foreign policy, based on 
soft power instruments and multilateralism, as something that makes 
America exceptional. He also insists that American exceptionalism does 
not mean that the US can exempt itself from the norms of international 
law, however, Obama’s speeches also contain a second aspect in his 
articulation of American exceptionalism. Obama does not think that the 
US should always have a very active foreign policy and, more importantly, 
he makes room for unilateral action and the use of hard power instruments 
in foreign policy. Regarding international law, he allows for the use of 
force even if is not in accordance with the norms of international law, 
whenever US national interests are threatened. The parallel existence of 
these two approaches is the reason we describe Obama’s American 
exceptionalism discourse as “dual”. Clearer articulation and much more 
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insistence on the first combination is the reason we added the attribute 
“unbalanced”. 
The focus of our research was Obama’s discursive articulation of American 
exceptionalism concerning US foreign policy and its stance towards 
international law. In other words, we have focused on identity, and not 
on practice. As we have explained, however, American exceptionalism is 
considered one of the most important mechanisms for the justification of 
foreign policy. It is obvious that the dual articulation of this concept allows 
Obama to justify a wide range of foreign policy practices and practical 
stances towards international law. The findings of this article should help 
further research about the way Obama’s articulation of this concept 
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